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Abstract
This paper explores the use of auctions for privatizing public assets. In our model, a
single ”insider” bidder (e.g. incumbent management of a government-owned ﬁrm) pos-
sesses information about the asset’s risky value. In addition, bidders are privately informed
about their costs of exploiting the asset. Due to the insider’s presence, uninformed bid-
ders face a strong winner’s curse in standard auctions with devastating consequences for
revenues. We show that the optimal mechanism discriminates against the informationally
advantaged bidder to ensure truthful information revelation. The optimal mechanism can
be implemented via a simple two-stage “qualifying auction.” In the ﬁrst stage of the
qualifying auction, non-binding bids are submitted to determine who enters the second
stage, which consists of a standard second-price auction augmented with a reserve price.
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11. Introduction
The World Bank’s “toolkit” or “practitioners’ guide” to privatization describes the following
two-stage auction procedure for privatizing public assets (Welch and Fr´ emont, 1998, p. 32): in
the ﬁrst stage non-binding expressions of interest are received from interested buyers. Based on
these expressions of interest and a review of the ﬁnancial capacity of potential bidders a short
list of potential buyers is selected. These bidders then move to the second stage of the process,
which consists of a more traditional auction with binding bids.
Welch and Fr´ emont (1998) mention several practical advantages of this procedure.1 In
this paper, we abstract away from these practical issues and investigate how the mechanism
performs in terms of more traditional economic criteria such as eﬃciency and revenue.2 An
increase in eﬃciency is often cited as one of the main goals of privatization but in many cases
generating high revenues is at least as important. For instance, European countries that face
the straightjacket of the Stability and Growth Pact have massively turned to privatization of
public assets to reduce deﬁcits and government debt.3 Similar trends are seen outside the
European Union, where revenue is an equally important objective of privatization.4 Moreover,
the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank explicitly mention using the revenue
from privatization to reduce government debt and enhance ﬁscal stability in their Guidelines
for Public Debt Management.5
In our model, bidders’ valuations for the asset consist of both a private and a common
value component. The former corresponds to the bidder’s cost of exploiting the asset, which
is privately known to the bidder. In addition, one “insider” bidder (e.g. the state-owned
ﬁrm’s incumbent management) is better informed about the asset’s common value. Besides
privatization, there are many other situations of interest where exactly one insider bidder is
better informed than the seller and other bidders. For example, when a company decides to
outsource its catering division it may solicit bids from outside catering companies as well as
from its current in-house caterer. Similarly, in management and employee buyouts (MEBOs)
the ﬁrm’s current management has a clear informational advantage relative to other investors.
As a ﬁnal example, consider licenses for spectrum usage, which typically have a lease period
1See also Gibbon (1996) and other “How-to-Guides” published by Privatization.org.
2For instance, we do not model potential problems with bidders’ ﬁnancial capacities.
3See, for instance, the Economist (2002b), the Economist (2004), and the OECD (2003).
4See, e.g., the Economist (2002a) on Central Europe, Prasad (2004) on China, and the International Monetary
Fund (2003) on a number of other countries.
5See the International Monetary Fund and World Bank (2002).
2of eight to ﬁfteen years. When such a license is re-auctioned the current user has superior
information about its proﬁtability.6
We are interested in situations where privatization involves substantial risk, i.e. when
uncertainty about the asset’s common value is large relative to private-value cost diﬀerences.
For example, when bidding for a contract to collect garbage, diﬀerences in ﬂeet operating costs
are likely small while the contract’s common value may vary depending on people’s willingness
to voluntarily sort their garbage into several categories (paper, plastic, glass, etc.). Likewise,
when market licenses are auctioned among ﬁrms with access to a common technology, private
value diﬀerences are negligible compared to uncertainty about common market characteristics.
Finally, this type of common value risk also plays a role in other more familiar settings. For
instance, when a high-visibility art work is sold, bidders’ valuations depend crucially on its
authenticity. This common value aspect introduces a strong winner’s curse element especially
if one of the bidders has inside information.7
We show that in such risky environments, standard auctions perform poorly in terms of ex-
pected revenue due to the possibility of a winner’s curse. Both the second price auction and the
English auction are dominated by the “qualifying auction” we study, which is modeled after the
two-stage procedure employed by the World Bank. In the ﬁrst stage of the qualifying auction,
bidders place non-binding bids and all but the lowest bidder are allowed to participate in the
second stage, which is a standard second price auction. We prove that the qualifying auction
augmented with a reserve price implements the optimal (revenue-maximizing) mechanism.
The reason why the qualifying auction outperforms standard auctions is that it eliminates
the adverse eﬀects of the winner’s curse. Indeed, there exists an equilibrium of the qualifying
auction where in the ﬁrst stage every bidders bids the unconditional expected value for the
asset. The intuition is that since ﬁrst-stage bids are non-binding, the expected value does not
have to be conditional on winning. If the insider bidder places a very low bid in the ﬁrst stage,
uninformed bidders observe the negative news about the asset’s common value and account for
this via their second-stage bids. Since the bidder with the lowest ﬁrst-stage bid is not allowed
6A related example is the auctioning of gas stations along the Dutch highways. In this auction, the current
owner competes with other oil companies for the rights to exploit the gas station in the next lease period.
7Consider the following excerpt taken from http://www.maineantiquedigest.com/articles/vangogh.htm.
“Want to take a chance on a Van Gogh? The bidding starts at $150,000 and there are no guarantees. You
have to act fast. The painting is referred to as ‘Mystery Vincent Van Gogh painting’ and as ‘Sunﬂowers and
Oleanders.’ The attorney for the trustee in the bankruptcy case already has a bid for $125,000 so the bidding
will have to go to $150,000 to top that and then can proceed in $10,000 increments. What’s the catch? Opinion
is deﬁnitely divided on whether the painting is a Van Gogh, whether it’s signed, and lots else. If you get a $15
million painting for $150,000, good for you. If you get a nice decoration for $150,000, good for the owners.”
3to participate in the second stage, there is no incentive for the informed bidder to signal bad
news if, in fact, she possesses good news about the asset’s common value.
Qualifying auctions were ﬁrst studied by Ye (2004) who refers to it as a process of “indicative
bidding.”8 Ye’s important contribution focuses on a diﬀerent aspect of the two-stage qualify-
ing auction, i.e. costly entry. In his model, bidders have some preliminary but inconclusive
information about the asset for sale. In the ﬁrst stage, they submit non-binding bids, which
are used to select a few bidders for the second stage. Those that qualify for the second stage
incur a large cost in determining their true, or ﬁnal, value for the asset.9 Ye shows eﬃcient
entry cannot be guaranteed with indicative bidding and he proposes alternative two-stage for-
mats to avoid this problem. The main diﬀerence with our paper is that in Ye’s (2004) model,
bidders are symmetric and entry, or acquiring information, is costly. In contrast, in our model
a single insider bidder possesses information that aﬀects all while entry is costless. We show
that qualifying auctions perform quite well in these situations.
Our paper is related to the work of Bulow, Huang, and Klemperer (1999) who consider
pure common-value takeover auctions where a single bidder has a (small) private-value toehold
in the company being acquired. They ﬁnd that in the ascending auction the existence of a
single toehold bidder can have disastrous eﬀects for revenue because other bidders face a strong
winner’s curse. This is akin to the situation that uninformed bidders face in our model. We
show that the qualifying model solves the winner’s curse problem by discriminating against the
informationally advantaged bidder.
Finally, there are a few papers that show technical similarities. Larson (2005) provides a
thorough investigation of existence and uniqueness issues in pure common value auctions. By
introducing small private value disturbances that vanish in the limit, Larson is able to pin down
a unique equilibrium for the pure common value case. Hernando-Veciana and Tr¨ oge (2004)
determine circumstances under which the insider bidder in an English auction is better oﬀ
disclosing her information. Their analysis of the English auction is parallel to that of section 2.
Hernando-Veciana (2004) shows that in pure common value second-price auctions, uninformed
bidders may have higher expected payoﬀs than the single insider bidder. None of these papers
determine the optimal mechanism for this context nor do they discuss the qualifying auction,
which is the main focus of this paper.
8See Kagel, Pevnitskaya, and Ye (2004) for an experimental test of Ye’s (2004) model.
9More precisely, bidder i’s ﬁrst-stage (second-stage) information is Xi (Yi) and her value for the asset is
Xi + Yi. To enter the second stage and learn Yi, qualifying bidders have to pay a large entry cost.
4The paper is organized as follows. The next section introduces the privatization model
and shows that standard auctions perform poorly in terms of revenue. Section 3 solves for
the optimal mechanism that maximizes revenue from privatization. Section 4 shows that the
optimal mechanism can be implemented using a qualifying auction augmented with a reserve
price. Section 5 concludes and the Appendix contains most of the proofs.
2. Standard Auctions for Risky Privatization
We assume that bidder i’s value for the asset consists of a common value component V + Θ,
with V known and Θ unknown, minus a private cost ci. In the “good” state of the world, G,
the common value is V + 1
2θ while in the “bad” state of the world, B, the common value is
V − 1
2θ. There are n bidders competing for the asset, n − 1 of which are uninformed about
the common value. In particular, these uninformed bidders possess only the prior information
that both states are equally likely, P(G) = P(B) = 1
2. In contrast, the insider bidder receives
a noisy signal ϑ ∈ {g,b} about the state of the world, where P(g|G) = P(b|B) = q > 1
2 and
P(b|G) = P(g|B) = 1 − q.
To simplify notation we deﬁne an uninformed bidder’s private value as si ≡ V − ci, for
i = 2,...,n, where the si have distribution function F(.) with associated density f(.) deﬁned
on the support [s, ¯ s]. This way the uninformed bidders’ values for the asset can be written as
si + Θ.10 The private value for the insider bidder depends on whether privatization occurs.
For instance, empirical evidence shows that privatization of a government-owned ﬁrm enhances
eﬃciency even when the current management remains in place (e.g., Hilke, 1993; Chapters 8, 9,
and 10 in Shleifer and Vishny, 1998). Explanations include the introduction of a hard budget
constraint for managers after privatization and the reduced inﬂuence of politicians on how the
ﬁrm is run. We assume the insider’s private value for the asset is given by s1 = s without
privatization,11 and s1 is a draw from F(.) deﬁned on [s, ¯ s] otherwise.12
Assumption 1 The density f(·) is symmetric and log-concave on [s, ¯ s].
Log-concavity implies among other things that the density is single-peaked and that the hazard
10We assume that s > θ so that bidders’ values are strictly positive.
11Setting s1 equal to s simply means that outside ﬁrms with lower private values cannot proﬁtably win the
auction.
12This assumption is made mainly for notational simplicity. Our results can easily be extended to the case
where the insider’s private-value distribution F1(.) is diﬀerent from F(.).
5rate f(s)/(1 − F(s)) is non-decreasing.13 Symmetry implies that the mean and median of the
distribution are given by (s + ¯ s)/2.
Our main interest concerns the case where the asset to be privatized carries substantial risk,
which occurs when the variation in the common-value is large relative to the variation in private
costs. In other words, we consider “almost common-value” auctions as in Bulow, Huang, and
Klemperer (1999).14 Our model is also related to that of Larson (2005) who focuses on the case
where the private value diﬀerences are vanishingly small.15
Assumption 2 The asset is “risky,” i.e. (q − 1
2)θ > ¯ s − s.
The deﬁnition of risky assets captures the idea that it is mainly the common-value component
that determines the asset’s value. Note that the expected value of the asset to the least
eﬃcient informed bidder when receiving good news, ϑ = g, is given by s+q(1
2θ)+(1−q)(−1
2θ).
Likewise, the expected value to the most eﬃcient bidder after receiving bad news, ϑ = b, is
¯ s + q(−1
2θ) + (1 − q)(1
2θ). Hence, in expected terms, the risky asset is worth more to the
least eﬃcient bidder who received good news than to the most eﬃcient bidder who received
bad news. This separation of expected values by the insider’s common-value signal is one
(technical) reason to focus on risky projects. More importantly, the applications we have in
mind (see the Introduction) are all characterized by a large degree of common-value uncertainty
while private-value diﬀerences are small.
We ﬁrst determine bidding behavior in an English auction. The optimal bidding strategy for
the insider is easy to characterize: drop out at the net expected value bI(sI|ϑ = g) = sI+(q− 1
2)θ
in case of good news and at bI(sI|ϑ = b) = sI−(q− 1
2)θ in case of bad news. For the uninformed
bidders the optimal bidding strategy takes the form of a cut-point rule: bid low when sU < s∗
and high when sU > s∗, see Figure 1. The following lemma characterizes this strategy and























where the ﬁnal inequality holds because f(s) is log-concave so f0(s)/f(s) is non-increasing in s. Hence, f(s)2 +
f0(s)(1 − F(s)) ≥ 0 or (f(s)/(1 − F(s)))0 ≥ 0.
14The main diﬀerence is that the latter paper considers the eﬀects of small value diﬀerences (due to “toeholds”)
that are commonly known by the bidders. In contrast, we consider the eﬀects of large informational diﬀerences.
15See also Hernando-Veciana (2004) and Hernando-Veciana and Tr¨ oge (2004).
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bU(sU)
¯ s + (q − 1
2)θ
s∗ + (q − 1
2)θ
s∗ − (q − 1
2)θ
s − (q − 1
2)θ
¯ s s∗ s
Figure 1: Uninformed bidder’s optimal bidding function in the English auction.
Lemma 1 The following constitutes an equilibrium of the English auction. The insider bidder
drops out at bI(sI|ϑ). An uninformed bidder drops out at
bU(sU) =
(
sU − (q − 1
2)θ if sU < s∗ = 1
2(s + ¯ s)
sU + (q − 1
2)θ if sU ≥ s∗ = 1
2(s + ¯ s)
when the insider is still active. If the insider dropped out at some price level, p, an uninformed
bidder drops out at p + max(0,sU − sI) where sI solves p = bI(sI|ϑ) for ϑ = b or ϑ = g.
Note that the English auction does not necessarily result in an eﬃcient allocation. For example,
when sI < sU < s∗, ineﬃciencies occur when the insider receives good news about the asset’s
value. Likewise, when s∗ < sU < sI, ineﬃciencies occur when the insider receives bad news
about the asset’s value. These ineﬃciencies are small in magnitude as they involve diﬀerences
of bidders’ private values, which are negligible for large θ. We next show that the impact of a
single insider on the auction’s revenue is more profound.
Proposition 1 When a risky asset is privatized using the English auction, the loss in revenue
due to the presence of a single insider grows linearly with θ as θ grows large.
7What about the second price auction? With one informed and one uninformed bidder the
uninformed bidder’s strategy is the same as in Lemma 1 as there is no opportunity for the
uninformed bidder to learn about the asset’s common value. With additional uninformed
bidders, however, the winner’s curse problem is exacerbated compared to the English auction.
In the latter, active uninformed bidders can quit immediately after the insider drops out at
a low price. In contrast, in the second price auction, an uninformed bidder may have to pay
another uninformed bidder’s high bid when the insider’s information is bad. To avoid such a
costly scenario, uninformed bidders will have to bid more cautiously in a sealed-bid second-price
auction compared to the English auction.
Lemma 2 The following constitutes an equilibrium of the second-price auction. The insider
bids bI(sI|ϑ). An uninformed bidder bids
bU(sU) =
(
s − (q − 1
2)θ if sU < s∗∗
B(sU) if sU ≥ s∗∗
with B(sU) strictly increasing in sU and s+(q− 1
2)θ < B(sU) < sU+(q− 1
2)θ for all s∗∗ < sU < ¯ s
and s∗∗ > s∗ = 1
2(¯ s + s).
Note that uninformed bidders’ optimal bids in the second price auction are more conservative
than those in the English auction in two ways. First, high bids in the English auction exceed
those in the second price auction.16 Second, the probability that an uninformed bidder bids
high in the second price auction is lower than in the English auction (1 − F(s∗∗) < 1
2). The
latter eﬀect becomes dominant when uncertainty about the common value grows.
Lemma 3 With two or more uninformed bidders limθ→∞ s∗∗ = ¯ s.
In other words, as the uncertainty about the common value grows the loss in revenue for
the seller is proportional to θ irrespective of the state of the world. Recall that in the English
auction, a loss proportional to θ occurs only in the bad state of the world or when all uninformed
bidders have below average private values. We thus have:
Proposition 2 When a risky asset is privatized using the second price auction, the loss in
revenue due to the presence of a single insider is even worse than in the English auction when
the uncertainty about the common value grows large.
16We say an uninformed bidder’s bid is “high” when it exceeds the insider’s optimal bid in case of good news
with positive probability.
8While our focus is on revenue it is interesting to note that also eﬃciency is lower in the second
price auction when uncertainty about the common value grows large.17
3. Optimal Mechanism
Here we derive the optimal (revenue-maximizing) mechanism for risky privatization. We assume
the designer can observe the insider’s identity, e.g. in an auction it is known which bid is
placed by the state-owned ﬁrm’s incumbent management.18 We consider direct revelation
mechanisms where each uninformed bidder truthfully reveals her one-dimensional type, si, and
the informed player 1 truthfully reveals her two-dimensional type (ϑ,s1). Let xi(s1,··· ,sn|ϑ)
denote the probability that player i is awarded the asset as a function of bidders’ reports,
ti(s1,··· ,sn|ϑ) her payment, and ui(s1,··· ,sn|ϑ) her utility. For i ≥ 2 we deﬁne bidder




xi(s1,··· ,sn|g))dF(S−i), where S−i = (s1,··· ,si−1,si+1,··· ,sn). Bidder i’s expected payment
ti(si) and expected utility ui(si) are deﬁned analogously. Let x1(s1|ϑ) = ES−1{x1(s1,··· ,sn|ϑ)}
denote the expected probability of winning for the informed bidder 1, with similar deﬁnitions
for t1(s1|ϑ) and u1(s1|ϑ).









Using the envelope theorem we have
∂ui(si)
∂si
= Eϑ{xi(si|ϑ)} ≡ xi(si),





1 ) + s∗),










18The next section discusses a practical implementation of the optimal mechanism, which does not require
this assumption.
9which can be integrated to give




This necessary condition for truth telling is also suﬃcient if xi(s) is non-decreasing in s.
Next we turn to the informed bidder 1. The same steps leading up to (1) show that for the
insider to truthfully reveal s1 we must have, for ϑ ∈ {b,g},












− t1(ˆ s|ˆ ϑ)}.
Lemma 4 provides suﬃcient conditions for bidders to participate and truthfully reveal their
private information. The proof uses the following insight: if the insider lies about her common
value information after receiving good news she also reports a private value ˆ s = ¯ s so as to
maximize her probability of winning. Likewise, if the insider lies about her common value
information after receiving bad news she reports a private value ˆ s = s. The conditions of
Lemma 4 ensure that neither deviation is proﬁtable.
Lemma 4 Bidders participate and truthfully reveal their types if (1) and (2) hold and
(i) ui(s) ≥ 0 for i ≥ 2, u1(s|b) ≥ 0 and
u1(s|g) = u1(¯ s|b) + x1(¯ s|b)
¡
(2q − 1)θ − (¯ s − s)
¢
. (3)
(ii) xi(si) is non-decreasing in si for i ≥ 2, x1(s1|ϑ) is non-decreasing in s1 for ϑ ∈ {b,g} and
x1(s|g) = x1(¯ s|b). (4)
Equations (3) and (4) patch together the insider’s expected utility and probability of winning
across the two information signals. They are suﬃcient but not necessary conditions, i.e. the
10equality signs in (3) and (4) can be relaxed to some degree.19 Strict equalities follow, however,
when we restrict attention to revenue-maximizing mechanisms, which we discuss next.
The seller’s expected revenue, R, equals the sum of the expected transfers from the bidders
plus the status quo revenues that occur when no privatization takes place. Using standard
manipulations (e.g. Myerson, 1981), the expected revenue can be written as










































The seller chooses the assignment functions, x(·|b) and x(·|g), and the utilities of the lowest
types, ui(s) for i ≥ 2 and u1(s|b) and u1(s|g), so as to maximize expected revenue subject to
the incentive compatibility and participation constraints of Lemma 4.





Assumption 1 ensures the left side is strictly increasing in s so the solution smin is unique. We
say the insider reports good (bad) news if the reported common-value signal is ˆ ϑ = g (ˆ ϑ = b).
Proposition 3 If the informed bidder reports bad news, the optimal mechanism assigns the
risky asset to the uninformed bidder with the highest reported private value if this value exceeds
smin; otherwise no privatization takes place. If the informed bidder reports good news, the
optimal mechanism assigns the risky asset to the bidder with the highest reported private value
if this value exceeds smin; otherwise no privatization takes place.





x1(s1|b)ds1 + x1(¯ s|b)((2q − 1)θ − (¯ s − s)),




≤ u1(s|g)−u1(¯ s|b) ≤
x1(s|g)
¡
(2q − 1)θ − (¯ s − s)
¢
.








+ (2q − 1)θ − (¯ s − s)
´
x1(s1|b)dF(s1).
Combining this with expression (5) for the expected revenue, we derive the following upper
bound on revenue





















(MRi(si) − s)xi(s1,··· ,sn|g)dF(s1)···dF(sn), (7)
where we deﬁned
MRi(si) = si −
1 − F(si)
f(si)
for i = 1,··· ,n, and
g MR1(s1) = s1 −
2 − F(s1)
f(s1)
− ((2q − 1)θ − (¯ s − s)),
and g MRi(si) = MRi(si) for i ≥ 2.
Figure 2 shows MRi(s)−s in case of good news (right panel) and g MR1(s)−s in case of bad
news (left panel). If g MR1(s1) − s were everywhere negative then the seller should obviously
never allocate the asset to the insider. Suppose g MR1(s1) − s is positive for some values of s1
as shown in the ﬁgure. At the upper end s1 = ¯ s we have
g MR1(¯ s) − s = 2(¯ s − s) −
1
f(¯ s)




where the ﬁrst inequality follows from symmetry of f(·) and the fact that the project is risky,
i.e. (q − 1
2)θ > (¯ s−s). So when the marginal revenue g MR1(s1) is positive for some values of s1
it is non-monotonic. Since the assignment function x1(s1|ϑ) has to be non-decreasing in s1 we
need to “iron out” the marginal revenue curve (see, for instance, Bulow and Roberts, 1989).
This yields the µµ0µ00µ000 curve in Figure 2. The main point is that the part of the curve that
pertains to bad news lies everywhere below the zero line that connects s and ¯ s. To understand
this result, note that
R ¯ s
s MRi(s)f(s)ds = s. (To sell to all types, revenue has to equal s since
12Good news Bad news
s s ¯ s
¯ s
g MR1(s) − s
A
B






Figure 2: Ironing out the insider’s marginal revenue curve.
that it is the maximum price at which all types are willing to buy.) The weighted D, C areas
(weighted by the density function f(·)) are therefore equal: D−C = 0. Obviously, D > A−B
so A − B − C < 0. The line connecting µ0 to µ00 thus has to lie below the zero to replicate
this negative area. As a result, the seller should never award the asset to the insider when the
insider reports bad news. In other words, x1(s1|b) = 0 for all s1 ∈ [s, ¯ s].
This implies u1(s|g) = 0 (see (3)) and the inequality in (7) becomes an equality. Hence,
revenue is maximized when the right side of (7) is, which requires allocating the project to the
bidder with the highest g MRi(si) − s in case of bad news and to the bidder with the highest
MRi(si)−s in case of good news conditional on these values being positive. The log-concavity
Assumption 1 ensures MR(si) is an increasing function and it is positive if and only if s > smin.
So in case of bad news the project is assigned to the uninformed bidder with the highest private
value if this private value exceeds smin otherwise no privatization takes place. In case of good
news the project is assigned to the bidder with the highest private value (whether or not the
bidder is informed) if this value exceeds smin, otherwise no privatization takes place. Q.E.D.
13Note that the optimal mechanism discriminates against the informationally advantaged bidder
to ensure truthful information revelation and protect uninformed bidders from the winner’s
curse. This is akin to Myerson’s (1981) solution for the case of asymmetric value distributions
where bidding credits are assigned to “weaker” bidders to enhance competition and force the
advantaged bidder to bid closer to her true value.
4. Qualifying Auctions
In this section we describe a practical implementation of the optimal mechanism, consisting of
a two-stage qualifying auction. In the ﬁrst stage all n bidders place a bid. The n − 1 highest
bids qualify for the second stage, which consists of a standard second price auction augmented
with a reserve price. All qualifying bidders learn the lowest ﬁrst-stage bid (but no other bids)
as does the seller who sets an optimal reserve price based on this information. The following
lemma describes an equilibrium in this context.
Lemma 5 In the ﬁrst stage of the qualifying auction, optimal bids are
bI(sI|ϑ) = sI + 1
2(P(G|ϑ) − P(B|ϑ))θ,
bU(sU) = sU.
All but the lowest bidder qualify for the second stage. The seller and qualifying bidders get to
know the lowest ﬁrst-stage bid from which they can perfectly infer the insider’s information ϑ.
The reserve price is set at r = bI(smin|ϑ) and qualifying bidders’ optimal second-stage bids are
b(s) =
(
bI(s|ϑ) if s ≥ smin,
“no bid” if s < smin,
with smin the unique solution to (6).
Proof. Since all bidders bid their unconditional expected values in the ﬁrst stage, the lowest
bid is either in the range [s − (q − 1
2)θ, ¯ s − (q − 1
2)θ] or in the range [s, ¯ s], which are disjoint
intervals by the risky asset assumption (q − 1
2)θ > ¯ s − s. In the former case, the seller and
qualifying bidders know ϑ = b while in the latter case they know ϑ = g.
To show that the above strategies constitute an equilibrium note that, given ﬁrst-stage
behavior, qualifying bidders know ϑ and hence it is optimal for them to bid their expected
14values in the second stage. Now consider the qualifying stage. Suppose the insider’s information
is (ϑ = g,sI): can the insider gain by bidding something diﬀerent then bI(sI|ϑ)? There are
two possibilities: (i) the deviating bid is the lowest ﬁrst-stage bid and (ii) it is not. In the
former case, the insider will forgo the opportunity to bid in the second stage, which cannot be
proﬁtable. In the latter case, the lowest ﬁrst-stage bid is determined by an uninformed bidder
(as it would be in equilibrium), in which case the seller and qualifying bidders infer that ϑ = g.
Again such a deviation by the insider is not proﬁtable. What if the insider’s information is
(ϑ = b,sI)? In this case she might deviate such that her bid is no longer the lowest ﬁrst-stage
bid. But then the seller and other qualifying bidders infer θ = g, in which case the insider will
not be able to proﬁtably win the second stage.
Finally, given the second price nature of the second stage auction, it is easy to show that
uninformed bidders have no incentive to deviate from truthful bidding in the ﬁrst stage. Q.E.D.
Note that the qualifying auction implements the optimal mechanism of the previous section
and its revenue is independent of the degree of common value uncertainty unlike that of the
standard auctions discussed above. Importantly, the qualifying auction is revenue maximizing
when the insider’s identity is unknown or cannot be (legally) used. Moreover, the qualifying
auction is robust in the sense that it is optimal also when there is no insider bidder. In this
case, all bidders are symmetric and the ﬁrst stage simply gets rid of the bidder with the lowest
private value with no consequences for seller revenues.
Proposition 4 The qualifying auction implements the optimal mechanism in situations with
and without informational asymmetries whether or not the insider’s identity can be observed.
5. Conclusion
High-stakes auctions for privatizing public assets are often plagued by substantial bidder asym-
metries, which may have devastating eﬀects for the auction’s revenue. Previous literature has
typically assumed that these asymmetries take the form of (known) private value diﬀerences
(e.g. Myerson, 1981; Bulow, Huang, and Klemperer, 1999). In contrast, in this paper we
analyze the eﬀects of informational asymmetries that arise when one insider bidder has supe-
rior information about the asset’s common value while private value diﬀerences are small. To
illustrate, consider the sale of the Los Angeles license in the 1995 FCC spectrum auction for
15mobile-phone broadband licenses. The following discussion is taken from Klemperer (2002).
While the license value was hard to estimate, it was probably worth similar amounts
to several bidders. But Paciﬁc Telephone, which already operated the local ﬁxed-
line telephone business in California, had distinct advantages from its database on
potential local customers and its familiarity with doing business in California.
Before bidding for the California phone license, Paciﬁc Telephone announced in the
Wall Street Journal that “if somebody takes California away from us, they’ll never
make any money” (Cauley and Carnevale, 1994, p.A4). Paciﬁc Telephone also hired
one of the world’s most prominent auction theorists to give seminars to the rest of
the industry to explain the winner’s curse argument that justiﬁes this statement,
and reinforced the point in full page advertisements that ran in newspapers of cities
where their major competitors were headquartered (Koselka, 1995, p. 63).
The auction was a standard ascending (English) auction. And the result was that
the bidding stopped at a very low price. In the end, the Los Angeles license yielded
only $26 per capita. In Chicago, by contrast, the main local ﬁxed-line provider was
ineligible to compete and the auction yielded $31 per capita even though Chicago
was thought less valuable than Los Angeles because of its lower household incomes,
lower expected population growth, and more dispersed population.
We interpret the California example as follows: Paciﬁc Telephone had inside information about
the market they were already operating in, and, hence, they knew much better than other
bidders how much the license would be worth. With diﬀerences in private valuations being
small, Paciﬁc Telephone could thus credibly claim that if its bid would be topped the winning
bidder would have to fall prey to the winner’s curse. As a result the license sales price remained
low (see Proposition 1) especially after a renowned auction theorist explained the logic behind
the winner’s curse to other bidders, making sure uninformed bidders would opt for a cautious
strategy (see Lemma 1).
The Chicago example shows that one way to resolve this problem is to exclude the insider
bidder. This solution, however, is not always legally possible nor is it optimal. Practical
literature concerning the divestment of government-owned assets, such as the World Bank’s
“How-to-Guide” for privatization (Welch and Fr´ emont, 1998), suggests a completely diﬀerent
approach based on a “qualifying auction.” This auction consist of two stages. In the ﬁrst stage,
bidders place non-binding bids and all but the lowest bidder are allowed to participate in the
second stage, which is a standard second price auction augmented with a reserve price.
16In this paper, we demonstrate that this simple format implements the revenue-maximizing
mechanism in situations where a single insider bidder has superior information about the asset’s
common value. The reason why the qualifying auction outperforms other formats is that it
eliminates the adverse eﬀects of the winner’s curse. Indeed, there exists an equilibrium of the
qualifying auction where in the ﬁrst stage every bidder bids the unconditional expected value
for the asset (see Lemma 5). The intuition is that since ﬁrst-stage bids are non-binding, the
expected value does not have to be conditional on winning. If the insider places a very low
bid in the ﬁrst stage, uninformed bidders observe the negative news about the asset’s common
value and account for this via their second-stage bids. And since the bidder with the lowest
ﬁrst-stage bid is not allowed to bid in the second stage, there is no incentive for the insider to
signal bad news if, in fact, she possesses good news.
Through the addition of a qualifying stage the auction discriminates against the informa-
tionally advantaged bidder to ensure truthful information revelation (see Proposition 3), which
is reminiscent of Myerson’s (1981) recipe for how to deal with value-advantaged bidders. An
important diﬀerence, however, is that the qualifying auction treats bidders in a symmetric man-
ner and neither the seller nor the bidders need to know the identity of the insider. Moreover,
qualifying auctions remain optimal in situations where informational asymmetries are small or
non-existent (Proposition 4). Their long-time use in the sales of complex and risky assets lends
further credence to their eﬀectiveness in combatting the adverse eﬀects of large informational
asymmetries.
17Appendix A. Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1. Uninformed bidders learn nothing about the asset’s common value from
the drop-out levels of other uninformed bidders. This implies that an uninformed bidder’s
optimal strategy is independent of the number of uninformed bidders. Consider the case of one
informed and one uninformed bidder. When the uninformed bidder with private value sU stays
in until s0
U − (q − 1
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(sU − sI)f(sI)dsI. (A.1)
Likewise, when the uninformed bidder with private value sU stays in until s0
























The ﬁrst term on the left side corresponds to the case where the insider received bad news (and,
hence, the uninformed bidder always wins) and the second term on the left side corresponds
to the case of good news. Obviously, the uninformed bidder’s optimal choice is to set s0
U = sU.
Furthermore, the expected payoﬀ of bidding low (A.1) is greater (smaller) than that of bidding
high (A.2) when sU is smaller (greater) than the average private value s∗. Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 2. We say the uninformed bid is high (low) when it has a positive (zero)
chance of winning against the equilibrium bid of an insider who received good news. The
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Clearly, it is optimal to set s0
U = sU in this case.
Optimal high bids can be derived from the following marginal argument: in equilibrium,
B(sU) follows from the condition that the costs and beneﬁts of raising the bid to B(sU + ²)
cancel. Note that such an increase has an eﬀect only when it turns the uninformed bidder into a
winner while she was previously losing. This occurs when (i) the insider received bad news and
18by raising her bid the uninformed bidder just beats the highest of the other uninformed bidders,
(ii) the insider received good news and by raising her bid the uninformed bidder just beats the
highest of the other uninformed bidders, and (iii) the insider received good news and by raising
her bid the uninformed bidder just beats the insider. Case (i) occurs when the highest of the
other uninformed bidders’ private values lies between sU and sU + ² while the insider’s private
value can be anything. This event occurs with probability ²(n − 2)f(s)F(s)n−3 and the net
gain in this case is sU − (q − 1
2)θ − B(sU). Similarly, case (ii) occurs with probability ²(n −
2)f(s)F(s)n−3F(B(sU)−(q − 1
2)θ) where the extra term is included to capture the probability
that the insider’s bid in case of good news, sI + (q − 1
2)θ, is less than B(sU). The net gain in
this case is sU + (q − 1
2)θ − B(sU). Finally, case (iii) arises when all other uninformed bidders
have private values less than sU and the insider’s private value lies between B(sU) − (q − 1
2)θ
and B(sU + ²) − (q − 1
2)θ. The probability of this event is ²F(s)n−2B0(sU)f(B(sU) − (q − 1
2)θ)
and the net gain in this case is sU + (q − 1
2)θ − B(sU).
Adding the diﬀerent scenarios yields the following diﬀerential equation for B(sU)
0 = (n − 2)f(sU)F(sU)
n−3(sU − (q − 1
2)θ − B(sU))
+ (n − 2)F(B(sU) − (q − 1
2)θ)f(sU)F(sU)
n−3(sU + (q − 1
2)θ − B(sU))
+ B
0(sU)f(B(sU) − (q − 1
2)θ)F(sU)
n−2(sU + (q − 1
2)θ − B(sU)) (A.3)
with boundary condition B(¯ s) = ¯ s + (q − 1
2)θ.
Note that for n = 2, (A.3) implies B(s) = s + (q − 1
2)θ, which is the result of Lemma 1.
For n ≥ 3, we do not have an explicit solution to (A.3) but some insight can be gleaned as
follows. First, the requirement that the bid is high implies B(sU) > s+(q− 1
2)θ. Hence, by the
risky asset Assumption 2, B(sU) > sU and (A.3) thus implies that B0(sU) > 0. Furthermore,
(A.3) implies B(sU) < sU + (q − 1
2)θ for sU < ¯ s since otherwise all terms on the right side are
negative. Finally, the boundary condition B(¯ s) = ¯ s + (q − 1
2)θ is derived as follows. Suppose,
in contradiction, B(¯ s) < ¯ s + (q − 1
2)θ. Since B0(sU) > 0, B(¯ s) > B(s) for all s < ¯ s so raising
B(¯ s) leaves unchanged the probability of winning against an uninformed bidder but raises the
probability of winning against an informed bidder with private value s < ¯ s who received good
news, which is proﬁtable. Hence B(¯ s) = ¯ s + (q − 1
2)θ.
The diﬀerential equation in (A.3) thus characterizes a well-deﬁned increasing bidding func-
tion. Our ﬁnal task is to determine the set of private values for which an uninformed bidder will
bid low or high. Let s∗∗ denote the private value for which the uninformed bidder is indiﬀerent
19between a low and high bid. This cut-oﬀ value can be determined as follows: deﬁne the low
bid L ≡ s∗∗ −(q − 1
2)θ and the high bid H ≡ B(s∗∗) where B(sU) is determined by (A.3). The









and the equilibrium expected payoﬀ from bidding high is















The additional terms on the right side arise as follows. In equilibrium, an uninformed bidder
with cut-oﬀ private value, s∗∗, never wins against other uninformed bidders who bid high, which
explains the F(s∗∗)n−2 term. Furthermore, the ﬁrst (second) term in the curly brackets pertains
to the case where the insider received bad (good) news. An uninformed bidder with private








∗∗ − s)dF(s), (A.4)
where s∗ ≡ E(s) = 1
2(s + ¯ s). This deﬁnes a negatively sloped curve in (s∗∗,B(s∗∗)) space that
runs from (s∗,s∗ + (q − 1
2)θ) to (¯ s,s + (q − 1
2)θ). The diﬀerential equation (A.3) deﬁnes a
positively sloped curve in (s∗∗,B(s∗∗)) space (since B0(·) > 0) that starts below s∗+(q− 1
2)θ at
s∗∗ = s∗ (since B(sU) < sU +(q − 1
2)θ for all sU < ¯ s) and ends at (¯ s, ¯ s+(q − 1
2)θ). The unique
intersection of these two curves deﬁnes the cut-oﬀ value s∗∗. Since B(sU) < sU + (q − 1
2)θ for
all sU < ¯ s, (A.4) implies s∗∗ > s∗. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 1. The ineﬃciencies mentioned in the main text may cause the bidder
with the highest private value to determine the price (instead of the bidder with the second
highest private value) with positive eﬀects on revenue. A lower bound for revenue loss results
by computing revenue as if it is always the bidder with the highest private value that determines
the price. If Y k
n denotes the kth highest from n private value draws the sales price is then based
on Y 1
n (instead of Y 2
n). The sales price is raised by (q − 1
2)θ when the insider receives good
news and the highest of the uninformed bidders’ private values exceeds s∗, and it is lowered
by (q − 1
2)θ otherwise. The former event occurs with probability 1
2(1 − (1
2)n−1). Hence, a
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2)θ − (E(Y 1
n) − E(Y 2
n)), which is linearly increasing in θ. Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 3. Suppose, in contradiction, limθ→∞ s∗∗ = ˜ s < ¯ s. For large θ, the
probability that an uninformed bidder with private value s > ˜ s pays another uninformed
bidder’s high bid in case of bad news is strictly positive (1
2(F(s)n−2 − F(˜ s)n−2) > 0), resulting
in a large loss. The uninformed bidder is better oﬀ bidding low, contradicting Lemma 2. Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 4. Note that bidders’ expected payoﬀs are non-negative so participation is
guaranteed. To ensure bidder 1 does not report ˆ ϑ = b when in fact ϑ = g we require
u1(s1|g) ≥ max
ˆ s
{x1(ˆ s|b)(s1 + (q − 1
2)θ) − t1(ˆ s|b)}. (A.5)
The incentive compatibility constraint for bidder 1 of type (ϑ,s1) = (b, ¯ s) implies, for all ˆ s,
x1(¯ s|b)(¯ s − (q − 1
2)θ) − t1(¯ s|b) ≥ x1(ˆ s|b)(¯ s − (q − 1
2)θ) − t1(ˆ s|b).
The risky asset Assumption 2 implies (2q − 1)θ > (¯ s − s1) for all s1, and since x1(·|b) is
non-decreasing we have, for all ˆ s,
x1(¯ s|b)((2q − 1)θ − (¯ s − s1)) ≥ x1(ˆ s|b)((2q − 1)θ − (¯ s − s1)).
Adding the previous two inequalities yields, for all ˆ s,
x1(¯ s|b)(s1 + (q − 1
2)θ) − t1(¯ s|b) ≥ x1(ˆ s|b)(s1 + (q − 1
2)θ) − t1(ˆ s|b).
Hence, the maximization problem in (A.5) is solved by ˆ s = ¯ s for all types s1. In other words, if
the insider lies about her common-value information by reporting ϑ = b while, in fact, ϑ = g,
she also reports ¯ s as her private value to maximize her probability of winning. Condition (A.5)
reduces to
u1(s1|g) ≥ x1(¯ s|b)(s1 + (q − 1
2)θ) − t1(¯ s|b)
= u1(¯ s|b) + x1(¯ s|b)((2q − 1)θ − (¯ s − s1)). (A.6)
21To prove this inequality, note that for ϑ = g the incentive compatibility equation (2) yields




≥ u1(s|g) + x1(s|g)(s1 − s) = u1(s|g) + x1(¯ s|b)(s1 − s), (A.7)
where we used that x1(·|g) is increasing and (4). Inequality (A.6) now follows from (A.7) and
(3).
Finally, to guarantee that an informed bidder with common-value signal ϑ = b never reports
ˆ ϑ = g, we require
u1(s1|b) ≥ max
ˆ s
{x1(ˆ s|g)(s1 − (q − 1
2)θ) − t1(ˆ s|g)}.
Proceeding in an analogous manner as above shows that the solution to the maximization
problem is given by ˆ s = s for all s1, so the condition becomes
u1(s1|b) ≥ x1(s|g)(s1 − (q − 1
2)θ) − t1(s|g)
= u1(s|g) − x1(s|g)((2q − 1)θ − (s1 − s)).
Using (3) and (4) the expression in the second line can be rewritten as u1(s|b)+
R ¯ s
s x1(s|b)ds−
x1(¯ s|b)(¯ s − s1) ≤ u1(s|b) +
R s1
s x1(s|b)ds = u1(s1|b) where the inequality follows since x1(s|b) is
non-decreasing in s. Q.E.D.
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